Contribution to a Public Good under Subjective Uncertainty by Banerjee, Anwesha & Gravel, Nicolas
HAL Id: halshs-01734745
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01734745v2
Submitted on 12 Sep 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Contribution to a Public Good under Subjective
Uncertainty
Anwesha Banerjee, Nicolas Gravel
To cite this version:
Anwesha Banerjee, Nicolas Gravel. Contribution to a Public Good under Subjective Uncertainty.
2019. ￿halshs-01734745v2￿
Working Papers / Documents de travail
WP 2019 - Nr 23
Contribution to a Public Good under Subjective Uncertainty
Anwesha Banerjee
Nicolas Gravel
Contribution to a Public Good under Subjective
Uncertainty∗
Anwesha Banerjee†and Nicolas Gravel‡
August 29th 2019
Abstract
This paper examines how voluntary contributions to a public good are
aﬀected by the contributors’ heterogeneity in beliefs about the uncertain
impact of their contributions. It assumes that contributors have Savagian
preferences that are represented by a two-state-dependent expected util-
ity function and diﬀerent beliefs about the beneﬁt that will result from
the sum of their contributions. We establish general comparative statics
results regarding the eﬀect of speciﬁc changes in the distribution of be-
liefs on the (unique) Nash equilibrium provision of the public good, under
certain conditions imposed on the preferences. We speciﬁcally show that
the equilibrium public good provision is increasing with respect to both
ﬁrst and second order stochastic dominance changes in the distribution of
beliefs. Hence, increasing the contributors’ optimism about the uncertain
beneﬁt of their contributions increases aggregate public good provision
provision, as does any homogenization of these beliefs around their mean.
Keywords: Voluntary provision, public good, uncertainty, beliefs,
optimism, consensus.
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"The debate’s over. The people who dispute the international consensus on
global warming are in the same category now with the people who think the
moon landing was staged on a movie lot in Arizona." (Al Gore)
"Whether global warming or climate change. The fact is: we didn’t cause
it. We cannot change it." (Donald J. Trump)
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1 Introduction
There are many situations where agents are uncertain about the beneﬁt they get
from contributing to a public good. The ﬁght against global warming through
carbon emission reductions is an example of such a situation. As shown on
Figure 1, borrowed from Millner, Dietz, and Heal (2013), there is considerable
scientiﬁc uncertainty about the impact of carbon accumulation on the Earth’s
temperature at the 2050 horizon. Moreover, as is also apparent in the picture,
there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity amongst scientists themselves regarding the
probability that they assign to increases in the Earth’s temperature associated
with speciﬁc scenarios of carbon accumulation (such as the "business as usual"
one on Figure 1). This heterogeneity in beliefs about the impact of carbon emis-
sions is also reﬂected in the variety of (less scientiﬁc) opinions on this matter
found in public debate, and illustrated by the polarized views of the two leading
American political ﬁgures quoted above. There is little doubt that a person’s
belief about the impact of carbon emissions on global warming will aﬀect this
person’s propensity to make costly eﬀorts to prevent climate change (see for ex-
ample Roser-Renouf, Maibach, Leiserowitz, and Zhao (2014)). After all, had he
been the US president, Al Gore would have certainly not taken the same decision
vis-à-vis the Paris agreement on global climate change as that taken by Donald
J. Trump. Other examples of contributions to a public good under subjective
uncertainty include contributions to charities or philanthropic institutions by
agents who are uncertain about their reliability or eﬀectiveness, individuals’ de-
cisions to vaccinate (see e.g. Brewer, Chapman, Gibbons, Gerrard, and McCaul
(2007)) or, in developing countries, to defecate in the open rather than in toi-
lets (see e.g. Clasen, Boisson, Routray, Torondel, Bell, Cumming, and Ensink
(2014)).
The purpose of this paper is to examine, in a somewhat general model of
voluntary provision of a public good, the impact of heterogeneity in beliefs on
the agents’ aggregate contribution. We speciﬁcally ask two broad questions:
1) Does the increase in some (or all) contributors’ optimism about their
contributions to a public good increase the total amount of these contributions?
That is, would the US make more eﬀort to reduce carbon emissions if some,
or all, of the US citizens who currently share Donald Trump’s beliefs about
human-made global warming switch to Al Gore’s view on this matter?
2) Does an increase in the consensus on the impact of individual contribu-
tions to a public good increase the overall level of provision? That is, would
Donald Trump and Al Gore together contribute more to the ﬁght against global
warming if they could bring their diﬀerent beliefs closer to each other?
These questions are asked in a setting analogous to the classical Bergstrom,
Blume, and Varian (1986) setup, but with the important diﬀerence that the
subjective beneﬁt of any combination of individual decisions is uncertain, and
that individuals diﬀer in their perception of this uncertainty. The uncertainty
is regarding two possible states of the world: an optimistic one, in which the
individual perceives the impact of contributors on public good provision in a
favorable way and a pessimistic one in which the individual is more skeptical
about the beneﬁt of contributing. Individuals diﬀer in the probability that they
attach to these two states. Optimistic individuals, like Al Gore, would attach
a probability close to 1 to the ﬁrst state. On the other hand, pessimistic (or
skeptical) individuals like Donald J. Trump would attach almost zero proba-
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Figure 1: Estimated distributions of increase in the Earth temperature (in cel-
sius) by 2050 under a business as usual scenario (Source: Millner, Dietz, and
Heal (2013)).
bility to the same optimistic state. But more intermediate attitudes between
these two extremes are certainly possible. We assume that an individual would
evaluate his/her contributive decision by the expectation - taken over his/her
beliefs - of the same state-dependent utility. Just like in standard models of
voluntary public good provision à la Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986),
state-dependent utility is taken to be a function of two variables: individual
eﬀort (given aggregate public good provision) and public good provision (given
individual eﬀort). In either the optimistic or the pessimistic state, the state-
dependent utility function is decreasing with eﬀort, increasing with the public
good, and concave with respect to the two variables. We also assume that the
marginal disutility of eﬀort is not strictly decreasing with respect to the total
amount of public good. In such a setting whatever the distribution of beliefs
among contributors, it is not hard to prove that there will be a unique Nash
equilibrium level of contributions.
This paper identiﬁes the impact of speciﬁc changes in the distribution of
beliefs on the (unique Nash) equilibrium aggregate level of contributions. We
ﬁrst establish easily that every individual’s equilibrium level of contribution
is increasing with respect to his/her own belief. This implies that individuals’
contributions will be ordered by their beliefs at a Nash equilibrium. We then
show that an increase in optimism in the population in the sense of ﬁrst-order
dominance (see e.g. Hadar and Russell (1974)) leads to an increase in the
aggregate contribution to the public good. The most important result of the
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paper concerns the impact of an increase in the consensus about the probability
of being in the optimistic state on the overall level of contribution. Assessing
this impact requires a deﬁnition of what it means for a distribution of beliefs to
be “more consensual” than another. Borrowing here again from the stochastic
dominance literature, and exploiting the two-state feature of our framework, we
deﬁne a distribution of beliefs to be more consensual than another when the
dominating distribution has the same average belief as the dominated one and
has been obtained from the latter by a ﬁnite sequence of Pigou-Dalton transfers
of probabilities attached by individuals to the optimistic state. We observe that
the generalization of this plausible notion of homogenization - or increase in
consensus - to more than two states is not immediate. Under some additional
conditions on the utility function, we show that the homogenization of beliefs in
this sense always leads to an increase in the equilibrium aggregate contributions
when the homogeneization takes place among strict contributors.
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, we add to the lit-
erature on public goods under uncertainty, by introducing agents’ heterogeneity
in the perception of this uncertainty. Second, we contribute to the literature on
distributional comparative statics for aggregative games and games with strate-
gic substitutes.
The literature on voluntary provision of public goods, initiated largely by
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) (see also Andreoni (1988)) is rather vast.
Yet there is relatively little research that examines the impact of uncertainty on
public good provision. Some, like Austen-Smith (1980) or Sandler, Sterbenz, and
Posnett (1987), have considered uncertainty regarding the actions of others.1
Our paper does not have much to say on this matter. Gradstein, Nitzan, and
Slutsky (1993) is one of the ﬁrst papers that we know that has examined the im-
pact of uncertainty on the beneﬁt from a public good. It has done so by examin-
ing the speciﬁc impact of price uncertainty on public good provision in a setting
à la Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986). There is also a large literature, nicely
summarized by Gradstein, Nitzan, and Slutsky (1992), that addresses the issue
of uncertainty in general non-cooperative games without speciﬁc concerns for
games of voluntary provision of a public good. There is also a sizable literature
devoted to the related issue of bargaining and negotiation regarding public good
provision under uncertainty. For example, Kolstad (2007) studies self-enforcing
international agreements under systematic or common uncertainty, while Bra-
moullé and Boucher (2010) extend the treaty formation model of Barrett (1994)
to the case of uncertainty for both a public good and a public "bad". However,
these papers suppose risk neutrality on the part of the negotiators who are also
often assumed to face the same uncertainty. Schumacher (2015) builds and em-
pirically tests a model in which beliefs of individuals inﬂuence their willingness to
contribute to expenditures towards a cause, such as preventing climate change.
However Schumacher (2015) assumes that utility is linear in income, and that
there are only two groups of individuals (optimists and pessimists). Moreover,
in Schumacher (2015), individuals’ contributions only determine the probabil-
ity of occurrence of a common shock which aﬀects the percentage of their ﬁnal
income. Hence, the uncertainty analyzed in Schumacher (2015) is very diﬀerent
from that considered in this paper. Bramoullé and Treich (2009) examine the
1Classical papers on conjectural variations and "non-Nash conjectures" about the reaction
of others such as Cornes and Sandler (1984), Cornes and Sandler (1985) and Sugden (1985)
or Itaya and Shimomura (2001) also belong to this stream of literature.
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impact of uncertainty regarding the beneﬁt of collective action with risk-averse
agents. They show that the introduction of uncertainty can, under some condi-
tions, lower the amount of a public bad or increase the amount of a public good.
However Bramoullé and Treich (2009) assume that all contributors face the same
uncertainty and, therefore, do not examine the impact on public good provision
of the contributors’ heterogeneity in their perceptions of uncertainty. There is
also a signiﬁcant literature that has examined the possibility that contributors
could be uncertain about others’ valuations of the public good, either in the set-
ting of Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) where the public good provided is
the sum of the individual contributions, or in the "Weakest-Link" setting (see
for instance Barbieri and Malueg (2019)) where the provided public good is the
smallest of all individuals contributions. Bac (1996) has considered an inﬁnitely
repeated game between two contributors who have beliefs about the preferences
of the other. Bag and Roy (2008) and Bag and Roy (2011) have analyzed se-
quential and simultaneous games of voluntary contribution to a public good in
the case where each contributor knows his/her own preference type but not the
type of the others. Their analysis assumes that all contributors have quasi-linear
preferences, and that the types are drawn from the same probability distribu-
tion. Hence, they do not address the issue of the possible heterogeneity of the
contributors’ beliefs. A paper that does examine this heterogeneity in beliefs is
Maldonado and Rodrigues-Neto (2016). It considers the case where contributors
have quasi-linear and logarithmic preferences and diﬀer by both their valuation
of the public good (measured by a coeﬃcient that multiplies the logarithmic
part of their utility) and their belief about the distribution of valuations in the
population. The analysis compares the Nash equilibrium that arises when there
is incomplete information about the other types and a situation where such in-
complete information is not present. However, it does not address the issue of
what happens - given incomplete information - when the potential contributors’
beliefs change. All in all, this literature is concerned with the uncertainty about
the characteristics of fellow contributors. The framework of analysis is therefore
one of incomplete information. This literature does not examine, in a situation
of complete information such as that considered here, the issue of uncertainty
regarding the beneﬁt of individual contributions to the public good. To the best
of our knowledge, the only paper that deals with heterogeneity of beliefs on the
beneﬁt of public good provision is Sakamoto (2014). Yet this paper analyzes
the impact of the diﬀerent beliefs that contributors assign to a collection of
diﬀerent probability distributions over the possible beneﬁts of public good pro-
vision. The considered framework is therefore that of objective ambiguity (see
e.g. Ahn (2008) or Gravel, Marchant, and Sen (2018)). By contrast, the current
paper does not suppose any ambiguity. It rather examines to what extent the
diversity of non-ambiguous beliefs about the impact of individual contributions
aﬀects the overall level of public good provision.
As for the theory of distributional comparative statics in aggregative games,
the literature that grows in the tradition of Topkis (1978) has established quite
general results for games where the players’ actions are strategic complements.
A good summary of these results is provided by Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
However, general results for games in which the players’ strategies are strategic
substitutes - like games of voluntary contributions to a public good such as
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) - are much more sparse. Corchòn (1994)
provides powerful comparative statics results for the case where players have
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strongly concave payoﬀ functions. These results by Corchòn (1994) have been
generalized signiﬁcantly by Acemoglu and Jensen (2013). However, these papers
only consider the impact of monotonic changes in the exogenous parameters
of the models (for instance, individuals’ beliefs) on the equilibrium. They do
not explore the impact of non-monotonic changes in the distribution of those
parameters. Jensen (2017) provides comparative statics of certain speciﬁc types
of changes in the distribution of individual parameters in the context of Bayesian
games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
our model of voluntary contributions to a public good with uncertainty and
heterogeneous beliefs. The main comparative statics results are provided and
discussed in Section 3 and Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a community made of a set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of n agents (with
n ≥ 2)). Any agent i ∈ N must choose a level ei ∈ [0, e] of eﬀort (say in carbon
emission reductions), where e is some strictly positive number, interpreted to be
the maximal amount of eﬀort that any agent can make. Two natural interpreta-
tions of eﬀort in our model come to mind. One could view it as reﬂecting the time
spent on the collective activity (for instance lobbying). In this case, the eﬀort
endowment e would measure some maximal time availability that an agent can
have. Another interpretation, more in line with the classical Bergstrom, Blume,
and Varian (1986) model, would interpret eﬀort in monetary terms. If this in-
terpretation is favoured, then e would be interpreted as the agent’s contributive
ability, which would therefore be taken to be same for all agents. Any given
proﬁle (e1, ..., en) ∈ [0, e]
n of eﬀorts made by the agents generates an aggregate
public good G =
n
i=1 ei that they all value. Each agent is, however, uncertain
about his/her subjective evaluation of any combination (e,G) ∈ [0, e]× [0, ne]
of his/her eﬀort and the aggregate public good produced by the sum of agents’
eﬀorts. The uncertainty concerns speciﬁcally two possible states of "optimism"
(Al Gore) or "pessimism" (Donald J. Trump) about the eﬀect of agents’ eﬀorts
on public good provision. If the optimistic state omaterializes, then a given com-
bination (e,G) of eﬀort and aggregate public good yields a utility of Uo(e,G).
On the other hand, if the pessimistic state p happens, then the utility provided
by this very same combination is Up(e,G). Agents diﬀer in their beliefs about
the likelihood of the optimistic state. Agent i believes the true state to be opti-
mistic with probability πi ∈ [0, 1]. Such an agent will evaluate the combination
(e,G) ∈ [0, e]× [0, ne] of eﬀort and aggregate public good by the expected state
dependent utility EU(πi; e,G) deﬁned by:
EU(πi; e,G) = πiU
o(e,G) + (1− πi)U
p(e,G) (1)
We assume throughout that the functions Uo and Up are at least thrice
diﬀerentiable2 with respect to their two arguments and are both decreasing
with respect to eﬀort, increasing with respect to the aggregate public good and
strictly concave.3 We also assume that Up(e,G) ≤ Uo(e,G) for any combination
2The (partial) derivative of a function g with respect to its jth argument is denoted by gj .
3That is, the function Uj (for j = o, p) satisﬁes Uj(λe + (1 − λ)e′, λG + (1 − λ)G′) >
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of eﬀort and aggregate public good (e,G) ∈ [0, e]× [0, ne] (given eﬀort and
the level of the public good, optimism is weakly preferable to pessimism). A
degenerate case of this model happens of course when Uo and Up are the same
functions and when, as a result, there is no uncertainty about the beneﬁt of
contributing and no heterogeneity among individuals. Functions Us (for s = o, p)
are also assumed to satisfy UseG(e, G) = UsGe(e, G) ≤ 0 for any (e, G) ∈ [0, e]×
[0, ne]. This assumption rules out the possibility for the (subjective) marginal
cost of eﬀort to be strictly decreasing with respect to the public good. The weak
formulation of the assumption makes it compatible with the possibility that
either (or both) the functions Uo and Up be additively separable with respect to
their two arguments. We ﬁnally assume that Use (0, 0)+U
s
G(0, 0) > 0 > U
s
e (e,G)+
UsG(e,G) for any G ∈ [0, ne] and s = o, p. The ﬁrst part of this assumption says
that an agent would always want to contribute at least a little bit when nobody
is contributing. The second inequality of this assumption says that an agent
would never choose to contribute all his/her eﬀort endowment. This assumption
rules out from the start Nash equilibria where nobody contributes and, at the
other extreme, Nash equilibria where some agents contribute all their eﬀort
endowment. However this assumption allows for Nash equilibria where some,
but not all, agents do not contribute. We denote by U the set of all pairs of
functions Uo and Up that satisfy these properties.
This framework is general enough to describe many situations of contribu-
tion to a public good under uncertainty examined in the literature. A special
case of the above model would be one where, for s = o, p, one has Us(e,G) =
−C(e)+Φs(G) for some state independent increasing and convex cost function
C and some increasing and concave state dependent function Φs. In the context
of preventing global warming, such a speciﬁcation, used notably by Bramoullé
and Treich (2009), is somewhat natural. The cost - say in dollars - of preventing
global warming by devoting costly immediate eﬀort in carbon emission reduc-
tions could plausibly be independent from the subjective appraisal of the impact
of aggregate carbon emissions on global warming. The state dependent function
Φs would measure, on the other hand, the monetary beneﬁt of global warming
reduction in state s of the impact of aggregate human eﬀorts - as measured by
G. This monetary beneﬁt would naturally be assumed to be an increasing and
concave function of the total eﬀort in carbon emission reductions. As a matter
of fact many contributions to the literature on the negotiation process leading to
international agreements on the prevention of global warming have considered
even more restrictive versions of this model. For example Ulph (2004) considers
countries involved in such a negotiation process with a linear utility function
of the form −be+ cG for some strictly positive real numbers b and c. Kolstad
(2005) considers a quadratic version of the same model.
Any distribution of beliefs π = (π1, ..., πn) ∈ [0, 1]n in the population gen-
erates the game in strategic (or normal) form G(π) in which N is the set of
players, [0, e] is the strategy set of any such player, and EU(πi; ei, ei+

j =i
ej) is
the payoﬀ received by player i at the strategy proﬁle (e1, ..., en) ∈ [0, e]
n when
he/she holds belief πi. Observe that πi is the only determinant of player i’s
payoﬀ in such a game. It is easy to see that the game G(π) is what has been
called by Corchòn (1994) an aggregative game (see also Dubey, Mas-Colell, and
λUj(e,G) + (1 − λ)Uj(e′,G′) for every λ ∈]0, 1[ and every distinct combinations (e,G) and
(e′,G′) of eﬀort and aggregate public good.
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Shubik (1980) and Shubik (1984)). A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium for the
game G(π) is an eﬀort proﬁle (e∗1, ..., e
∗
n) ∈ [0, e]
n such that, for every individual
i ∈ N and eﬀort level ei ∈ [0, e] for this agent, one has:
EU(πi; e
∗
i , e
∗
i +

j =i
e∗j ) ≥ EU(πi; ei, ei +

j =i
e∗j ) (2)
We start by establishing, in Proposition 1 below, the existence and unique-
ness of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the game G(π) for any distrib-
ution of beliefs π = (π1, ..., πn) ∈ [0, 1]
n. This result is obviously an important
preliminary step for identifying the eﬀect of speciﬁc changes in the distribution
of beliefs on the Nash equilibrium of the game. Such an endeavour can obvi-
ously not be achieved if Nash equilibria do not exist for some speciﬁcation of
the beliefs. Moreover, if there are many diﬀerent Nash equilibria that can result
from a particular distribution of beliefs, it is diﬃcult to predict which of them
would be achieved if the distribution of beliefs changes.
A preliminary step for establishing this result is the following technical
lemma, that establishes some monotonicity properties of the function T : [0, 1]×
[0, e]× [0, ne]→ R deﬁned, for any (π, e, G) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, e]× [0, ne], by:
T (π, e, G) := π[Uoe (e, G) + UoG(e, G)] + (1− π)[Upe (e, G) + UpG(e, G)] (3)
The function T , also analyzed in Corchòn (1994), is nothing but the derivative
of the expected state-dependent utility function of Expression (1) with respect
to the agent’s eﬀort given the eﬀorts by others. This derivative, that is zero for
any agent who contributes a positive amount at a Nash equilibrium, plays for
this reason a key role in the characterization of such Nash equilibria. The lemma
- proved in the Appendix like all formal results of the paper - is the following.
Lemma 1 Let π = (π1, ..., πn) ∈ [0, 1]n be a distribution of beliefs and let G(π)
be the associated game in strategic form. Then, if any player i’s payoﬀ of this
game writes πiU
o(ei, ei+

j =i
ej)+(1−πi)U
p(ei, ei+

j =i
ej) for a pair of functions
Uo and Up in the set U, the function T deﬁned by (3) is strictly decreasing with
respect to both e and G.
Equipped with this lemma, we establish in the following proposition the
existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for the game G(π) for any
distribution (π1, ..., πn) of beliefs.
Proposition 1 Let π = (π1, ..., πn) ∈ [0, 1]
n be a distribution of beliefs and let
G(π) be the associated game in strategic form. Then, if any player i’s payoﬀ of
this game writes πiU
o(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) + (1 − πi)U
p(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) for a pair of
functions Uo and Up in U, then the game G(π) admits a unique Nash equilib-
rium.
While a direct proof of Proposition 1 is provided in the Appendix, one could
alternatively obtain the result by mapping the current framework into the clas-
sical Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) setting in which the existence and
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uniqueness of Nash equilibrium has been established. An important step in this
mapping would be the observation that, for any given belief π, the function
Ψπ : [0, e]× [0, ne] deﬁned by
Ψπ(x,G) = πUo(e− x,G) + (1− π)Up(e− x,G)
for any (x,G) ∈ [0, e] × [0, ne] is nothing but a standard consumer’s utility
function (parameterized in a particular way by π) of the kind considered by
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986). This function is strictly increasing and
concave in its two arguments (the ﬁrst argument being interpreted as the "eﬀort
not spent" by the agent). Another step in the mapping would be the remark
that if, as assumed herein, UseG(e, G) = UsGe(e, G) ≤ 0 for any (e, G) ∈ [0, e]×
[0, ne], then the consumer’s utility function Ψπ treats both the "private good"
x and the public good G as being normal in the sense of classical consumer’s
theory. The normality of both the public and the private good guarantees that
the assumption formulated by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) (bottom
of p. 32) holds. The observation that our model ﬁts entirely in the Bergstrom,
Blume, and Varian (1986) framework should make one aware that many features
of the Nash equilibrium in Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) will also be
present herein. For example, Nash equilibrium levels of eﬀorts will in general
be ineﬃcient in our model, just as they are in Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
(1986). However, the particular parametrization of agents’ preferences in the
forms of their beliefs raises comparative statics questions that could not be
formulated in the Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) setting. It is to these
comparative statics questions that we now turn.
The ﬁrst set of such questions concerns the eﬀect of an increase in optimism
for some (or all) the agents on the sum of their contributing eﬀorts at the (Nash)
equilibrium. The answer to this ﬁrst set of questions rides on the following
additional condition imposed on the agents’ preferences.
Condition 1 For any (e, G) ∈ [0, e]× [0, ne], it is the case that Uoj (e, G) ≥
Upj (e, G) for j = e,G (with at least one of the two inequalities being strict)
This condition requires the extra beneﬁt obtained by an agent from an addi-
tional unit of the public good resulting from others’ eﬀorts to be weakly larger
in the optimistic state than in the pessimistic one. This assumption also re-
quires the (subjective) marginal cost of eﬀort - given public good provision - to
be (weakly) lower in the optimistic than in the pessimistic state. Inverting the
sign of these inequalities will naturally lead to inverting the direction of this
comparative statics eﬀect. Of course, the assumption that the ordering of the
partial derivatives of the functions Uo and Up is invariant to the choice of the
particular combination of eﬀort and public good at which the derivatives are
evaluated is a strong one.
We start the statement of the comparative statics results by establishing, in
the following proposition, that for any distribution of beliefs (π1, ..., πn) ∈ [0, 1]
n,
the agents’ contributions at the (unique) Nash equilibrium of the associated
game will be weakly ordered by their beliefs. The proposition also establishes
that, for those agents who contribute positively to the public good, their levels
of contribution will be strictly increasing with respect to their belief. This simple
result, interesting in its own right, plays an important role in the two additional
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(and more substantive) comparative statics results of the paper. For one thing, it
implies that any Nash equilibrium combination of eﬀorts is entirely determined
by the agents’ beliefs in the following sense that up to a belief threshold, nobody
will contribute while everyone with a belief above the threshold will contribute a
strictly positive amount. Moreover, those positive contributors, who will always
exist thanks to the assumption that Use (0, 0) + U
s
G(0, 0) > 0 for s = o, p, will
be strictly ordered by their beliefs. The result, proved in the Appendix, is the
following.
Proposition 2 Let π = (π1, ..., πn) ∈ [0, 1]
n be a distribution of beliefs and let
G(π) be the associated game in strategic form. Assume that any agent i’s payoﬀ
of this game writes πiU
o(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) + (1 − πi)U
p(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) for a pair
of functions Uo and Up in U satisfying Condition 1. Then, if e∗(π) ∈ [0, e]n is
the (unique by Proposition 1) Nash equilibrium of G(π), it is the case that πi ≥
πh =⇒ e∗i (π) ≥ e
∗
h(π). Moreover, for any agents h and i such that e
∗
i (π) > 0
and e∗h(π) > 0, one has πi > πh =⇒ e
∗
i (π) > e
∗
h(π).
An obvious consequence of Proposition 2 is that agents’ contributions at
a Nash equilibrium are a (weakly increasing) function of their beliefs only. In
particular, permuting any distribution of beliefs (π1, ..., πn) ∈ [0, 1]
n would have
no eﬀect on the total sum of eﬀorts provided at equilibrium and would only lead
to the very same permutation of the agents’ contributions. Because of this, we
can restrict attention, in what follows, to ordered distributions of beliefs such
that π1 ≤ π2 ≤ ... ≤ πn. Proposition 2 also entails that, for any ordered
distribution π = (π1, ..., πn) ∈ [0, 1]
n of beliefs, there will be an index c(π) ∈
{1, ..., n} such that:
e∗i (π) ≥ e
∗
c(π)(π) > 0
for all i ∈ N such that i > c(π) (if there are any such i) and:
e∗h(π) = 0
for every h < c(π) (if any). Hence, agent c(π) is the smallest strict contributor
at the Nash equilibrium associated to the distribution of beliefs π ∈ [0, 1]n. Of
course the identity of this smallest strict contributor depends upon the whole
distribution of belief (and more generally upon the agents’ preferences) so that
nothing general can be said about it.
We now show that the total amount of contribution to the public good at a
Nash equilibrium will never diminish when there is an improvement in optimism
in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. Recall that an (ordered) distri-
bution of beliefs (π1, ..., πn) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the (ordered)
distribution (π′1, ..., π
′
n) if and only if it is the case that πi ≥ π
′
i for every agent
i (with the dominance being strict if at least one of the inequality is strict). We
also show that if this (ﬁrst order dominance) increase in optimism is associated
with a strict increase in optimism from the part of at least one strict contrib-
utor at the initial Nash equilibrium, then the total public good provided will
strictly increase as result. We speciﬁcally prove in the Appendix the following
proposition.
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Proposition 3 Let π = (π1, ..., πn) and π
′ = (π′1, ..., π
′
n) be two distribu-
tions of beliefs in [0, 1]n satisfying π1 ≤ π2 ≤ ... ≤ πn and π′1 ≤ π
′
2 ≤
... ≤ π′n, let G(π) and G(π
′) be the games in strategic form associated to
these two distributions and let e∗(π) ∈ [0, 1]n and e∗(π′) ∈ [0, 1]n be their
(unique by Proposition 1) Nash equilibria. Assume that any agent i’s pay-
oﬀs in these two games write πiU
o(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) + (1 − πi)U
p(ei, ei +

j =i
ej)
and π′iU
o(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) + (1 − π
′
i)U
p(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) for a pair of functions
Uo and Up in U satisfying Condition 1. If πi ≥ π
′
i for all i, then one has
i
e∗i (π) ≥

i
e∗i (π
′). Moreover, if the distributions of beliefs π and π′ are such
that πh > π′h for at least one h ≥ c(π
′), then one has

i
e∗i (π) >

i
e∗i (π
′).
We next move to our second comparative statics result which identiﬁes the
impact, on the aggregate equilibrium eﬀort, of an increase in the consensus
that may exist among agents as to the likelihood of the optimistic state. In
the example of global warming discussed earlier, Al Gore was referring to the
emergence of a consensus about the human causes of climate change. Debates
and discussions among agents are indeed likely to increase the existing consensus
on that matter. Of course a consensus can a priori be reached around any
"average" level of optimism. But suppose we take this average level of optimism
as given. What is the eﬀect - on the total contribution to the public good - of
bringing everybody in the society closer to this average level of consensus ?
This is the question that we now address. Answering this question requires of
course a deﬁnition of what it means for a distribution of beliefs to be "more
consensual" than another.
To motivate our deﬁnition of that notion, imagine that D. Trump and A.
Gore are forming a community. Assume that D. Trump initially assigns zero
probability to the (optimistic) state in which human eﬀorts to reduce emissions
have a substantial positive impact on utility while A. Gore assigns the polar
opposite probability 1 to that same state. The average probability assigned
to the optimistic state in this two-agent community is 1/2. Imagine a scenario
where D. Trump and A. Gore engage together in discussions and try to convince
each other of the validity of their respective beliefs. One could of course be more
convincing than the other and, therefore, be more successful in bringing the
other closer to his view. But suppose that the two agents are equally convincing
and manage, after some discussion, to get their beliefs closer. For example, at the
end of the discussion, D. Trump’s belief could be 1/4, while A. Gore’s one could
be 3/4. The average probability assigned in the population to the optimistic
scenario would still be 1/2, but the two members of the community would be
closer to each other (and to this average). In such a case, we would say that the
consensus in the society has increased.
Speciﬁcally, our proposed deﬁnition of "an increase in consensus" is based
on the notion of Lorenz dominance of one distribution of beliefs over another
that is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 Let π = (π1, ..., πn) and π
′ = (π′1, ..., π
′
n) be two distributions
of beliefs in [0, 1]n such that π1 ≤ π2 ≤ ... ≤ πn, π′1 ≤ π
′
2 ≤ ... ≤ π
′
n and
i∈N
πi =

i∈N
π′i. We say that π is more consensual than π
′ if and only if, for
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any k ∈ N , it is the case that
k
i=1
πi ≥
k
i=1
π′i.
As is well-known from the inequality measurement literature, and in par-
ticular the Hardy-Littlewood-Polya theorem (see e.g. Berge (1959), p. 191 or
Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett (1973)), there is an equivalent deﬁnition of "more
consensual than" that can be expressed in terms of bilateral Pigou-Dalton trans-
fers. This equivalent deﬁnition will turn out to be more convenient for establish-
ing the last comparative statics result of this paper. The deﬁnition of a bilateral
Pigou-Dalton transfer is as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 Let π = (π1, ..., πn) and π
′ = (π′1, ..., π
′
n) be two distributions
of beliefs in [0, 1]n such that π1 ≤ π2 ≤ ... ≤ πn, π′1 ≤ π
′
2 ≤ ... ≤ π
′
n. We say
that π has been obtained from π′ by a bilateral Pigou-Dalton transfer if there
are two agents g and h and a strictly positive number δ such that πi = π′i for
all i /∈ {g, h} and πg = π
′
g + δ ≤ π
′
h − δ = πh.
In words, a Pigou-Dalton transfer is the formal description of a balanced
"debate" between optimistic agent h (Gore) and pessimistic agent g (Trump).
At the end of this balanced debate, Trump has gained δ of optimism but this
gain has been counterbalanced by the loss of optimism by Gore by exactly that
same δ.
The Hardy-Littlewood-Polya theorem, which establishes an equivalence be-
tween the fact for one distribution of beliefs to be more consensual than another
as per Deﬁnition 1 and the possibility of going from the less to the more con-
sensual distribution by a ﬁnite sequence of bilateral Pigou-Dalton transfers, is
formally stated as follows.
Theorem 1 (Hardy-Littlewood-Polya) Let π = (π1, ..., πn) and π′ = (π′1, ..., π
′
n)
be two distributions of beliefs in [0, 1]n such that π1 ≤ π2 ≤ ... ≤ πn, π
′
1 ≤ π
′
2 ≤
... ≤ π′n. Then π is more consensual than π
′ as per Deﬁnition 1 if and only if
there exists a sequence of t ∈ N+ distributions of beliefs (with t ≥ 2) πk ∈ [0, 1]n,
for k = 1, ..., t such that
(i) π1 = π,
(ii) πt = π′ and
(iii) πk has been obtained from πk+1 by a bilateral Pigou-Dalton transfer as per
Deﬁnition 2 for all k = 1, ..., t− 1.
Using this theorem, we examine the impact of an increase in consensus in
the sense of Deﬁnition 1 on the aggregate Nash equilibrium eﬀort. As it turns
out, the set of assumptions made thus far on the utility functions - namely that
Uo and Up belong to U and satisfy Condition 1, does not suﬃce for obtaining
clear cut conclusions on that matter. Intuitively, if an agent "transfers" part of
his/her optimism to someone else, this has two conﬂicting eﬀects. On the one
hand, the "giver" of optimism will tend to reduce his/her contribution while the
"receiver" of optimism will conversely increase his/her eﬀort. The two forces
are clearly playing in opposite directions. Hence, some additional conditions
on the utility functions are required to predict the relative strength of these
two opposite forces. As it turns out, the following set of conditions on Uo and
Up are suﬃcient, when applied to functions that belong to U and that satisfy
Condition 1, for establishing the result that an increase in consensus - in the
sense of Deﬁnition 1 - will increase the aggregate amount of contributions.
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Condition 2 For any G ∈ [0, ne], and any e and e
′
such that e ≥ e′, one has:
(i) Uoj (e,G)− U
p
j (e,G) ≤ U
o
j (e
′, G)− Upj (e
′, G) for j = e,G and
(ii) Uskl(e
′,G) ≤ Uskl(e,G) for s = o, p, k = e,G and l = e,G
with at least one of the inequalities in (i) and (ii) being strict if e > e′.
Part (i) of Condition 2 says that, as agents increase their eﬀort, they expe-
rience less diﬀerence in the marginal beneﬁt (or cost) of additional individual
(or collective) eﬀort between the two states. If, as assumed in Condition 1,
the marginal beneﬁt of the public good (given individual eﬀort) is larger in the
optimistic than in the pessimistic state, then Condition 2 requires this diﬀer-
ence in marginal beneﬁt to be decreasing with eﬀort. Similarly, if the marginal
cost of eﬀort (given public good provision) is lower in the optimistic than in
the pessimistic state, then the diﬀerence should also be increasing with individ-
ual eﬀort. Part (ii) of Condition 2 makes additional assumptions on the second
derivatives of the state-dependent function for each state. Speciﬁcally, it requires
all second order derivative of the state-dependent function Us (for s = o, p) to
be increasing in eﬀort. This implies in particular that the assumed concavity of
the state-dependent utility function with respect to either eﬀort or public good
(which leads to a negative second derivative) is decreasing with eﬀort. It also
implies that the assumed non-negative second cross-derivative between eﬀort
and public good is smaller when the eﬀort is low than when it is high.
Condition 2 is certainly demanding. Reversing inequalities in statements
(i) and (ii) of the condition would reverse the direction of the comparative
statics eﬀect that it identiﬁes. Of course the requirement that the inequalities
in Statements (i) and (ii) of Condition 2 hold everywhere is strong. Since the
strength and meaning of Condition 2 can be diﬃcult to grasp with fully general
utility functions, it may be useful to interpret it in the (highly) speciﬁc case of
the additively separable monetary evaluation of the beneﬁt to global warming
prevention discussed above, where Us(e,G) = −C(e)+Φs(G) for s = o, p. In this
case, Condition 2 (i) would hold trivially, and Condition 2 (ii) would amount to
requiring that the function C has a negative third derivative. That is, Condition
2 in that context reduces to the requirement that the increase in the marginal
cost of eﬀort be decreasing with eﬀort. This is clearly a restrictive condition.
But it does not strike us as being unreasonable.
Be that as it may, Condition 2 plays an important role in the proof of the last
comparative statics result of this paper to which we now turn. Contrary to what
was the case for the results proven so far (for example Proposition 3), the result
that we are about to state - namely that aggregate eﬀort increases - at least
weakly - with consensus - holds only when the gain in consensus occurs between
two strict contributors of any given Nash equilibrium. There is an obvious reason
for this. Suppose in eﬀect that, at some Nash equilibrium, someone with a
very optimistic belief is contributing while another more pessimistic does not
contribute at all. Imagine then that a small Pigou-Dalton transfer of beliefs takes
place between these two agents, everything else remaining the same. Suppose
that the increase in optimism of the non-contributor brought about by the
transfer is not suﬃcient for making him/her a contributor. Then the transfer
will only end up reducing the optimism of one active contributor, everything else
remaining the same. As shown in Proposition 3, this will lead to a reduction
in the total amount of contributions by those contributors. Hence, in a case
like this, performing a bilateral Pigou-Dalton transfer would actually lead to a
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reduction in the total contributive eﬀort of the community.
However, if the transfer takes place between two active contributors, then
the total contributive eﬀort will weakly increase. The formal statement of this
result, proved in the Appendix, is as follows.
Proposition 4 Let π = (π1, ..., πn) and π′ = (π′1, ..., π
′
n) be two distribu-
tions of beliefs in [0, 1]n satisfying π1 ≤ π2 ≤ ... ≤ πn and π′1 ≤ π
′
2 ≤
... ≤ π′n, let G(π) and G(π
′) be the games in strategic form associated to
these two distributions and let e∗(π) ∈ [0, 1]n and e∗(π′) ∈ [0, 1]n be their
(unique by Proposition 1) Nash equilibria. Assume that any agent i’s pay-
oﬀs in these two games write πiU
o(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) + (1 − πi)U
p(ei, ei +

j =i
ej)
and π′iU
o(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) + (1 − π
′
i)U
p(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) for a pair of functions
Uo and Up in U satisfying Conditions 1 and 2. Then, if π has been obtained
from π′ by a bilateral Pigou-Dalton transfer as per Deﬁnition 2 involving two
agents g and h such that e∗g(π
′) > 0 and e∗h(π
′) > 0, it must be the case that
i
e∗i (π) >

i
e∗i (π
′).
Proposition 3 shows, under Condition 1, that increasing optimism in the
community in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance increases the ag-
gregate eﬀort that agents are willing to devote to the production of a public
good. Proposition 4 shows, under the additional condition 2, that increasing
consensus - in the sense of a Pigou-Dalton transfer - between the beliefs about
the likelihood of the optimistic state held by two strict contributors at a Nash
equilibrium also increases the total eﬀort that the agents are willing to make for
providing the public good. An obvious corollary to these two propositions is the
favorable impact, on global eﬀort, of a combination of an increase in optimism
- in the sense of ﬁrst order dominance - and an increase in consensus, in the
form of a sequence of Pigou-Dalton transfers when the latter take place among
strict contributors. Consider two ordered distributions of beliefs (π1, ..., πn) and
(π′1, ..., π
′
n) such that, for any k = 1, ...n, one has
k
j=1
πj ≥
k
j=1
π′j (4)
Observe that, contrary to what was the case for the deﬁnition of an increase
in consensus, we do not require the average optimism to be the same. It is,
for instance, possible to have
n
j=1 πj >
n
j=1 π
′
j so that the community with
belief (π1, ..., πn) is more optimistic in average (or in total if the population size
is the same) than (π′1, ..., π
′
n). The requirement that Inequality (4) holds for
all k = 1, ..., n between two distributions (π1, ..., πn) and (π
′
1, ..., π
′
n) is usually
referred to as Generalized Lorenz dominance (see e.g. Shorrocks (1983)). One
can then obtain the following immediate corollary of Propositions 3 and 4 (using
Theorem 1). Observe the important limitation, for the reasons given before the
statement of Proposition 4, of the scope of the corollary to two strictly interior
Nash equilibria.
Corollary 1 Let π = (π1, ..., πn) and π
′ = (π′1, ..., π
′
n) be two distributions of
beliefs in [0, 1]n satisfying π1 ≤ π2 ≤ ... ≤ πn and π′1 ≤ π
′
2 ≤ ... ≤ π
′
n, let G(π)
14
and G(π′) be the games in strategic form associated to these two distributions
and let e∗(π) ∈ [0, 1]n and e∗(π′) ∈ [0, 1]n be their (unique by Proposition 1)
Nash equilibria. Assume that any agent i’s payoﬀs in these two games write
πiU
o(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) + (1− πi)U
p(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) and π
′
iU
o(ei, ei +

j =i
ej) + (1−
π′i)U
p(ei, ei+
j =i
ej) for a pair of functions U
o and Up in U satisfying Conditions
1 and 2. Suppose also that the Nash equilibria are such that e∗i (π
′
1, ..., π
′
n) > 0
and e∗i (π1, ..., πn) > 0 for all i. Then, if Inequality 4 holds for all k = 1, ..., n,
one must have

i
e∗i (π
′
1, ..., π
′
n) >

i
e∗i (π1, ..., πn).
The analysis done so far examines the impact of speciﬁc changes in the
distribution of the agents’ beliefs on the total amount of their contributions at
the Nash equilibrium. It does not say much about the impact of those changes in
beliefs on the agents’ welfare. Even if agents contribute more - in the aggregate
- when they are more optimistic and/or more homogeneous in their beliefs, are
they better oﬀ as a result?
Comparisons of well-being levels between Nash equilibria are, of course,
tricky in the present context because the ex ante utility function used by agents
to evaluate outcomes is not the same across equilibria. An agent who becomes
more optimistic experiences a change in preferences which leads him/her to
weigh more the utility associated with the optimistic state than that associated
with the pessimistic one. It is therefore not clear which utility function one
should use for evaluating the well-being of this agent. There seem to be three
possibilities here.
1) Use the utility function that the agent had before the change in beliefs.
2) Use the after change utility function.
3) Compare the values achieved by the two diﬀerent functions: one after the
change, and the other before it.
These three possible deﬁnitions are not independent, at least if we assume
that the utility at the optimistic state is not smaller - for a given level of indi-
vidual and collective eﬀort - than that in the pessimistic state. Suppose indeed
that the utility of an agent who becomes more optimistic is lower, in the Nash
equilibrium obtained after the change of optimism, than what it was at the
before-change Nash equilibrium. Then this welfare ranking of the two Nash
equilibria would be agreed upon by either the before-change utility function, or
the after-change utility function. In eﬀect, the increase in optimism increases the
weight attached by the agent to the utility associated to the optimistic state. If
this utility is larger than that of the pessimistic state (given public good provi-
sion and eﬀort), then, the fact that the agent nonetheless suﬀers from becoming
optimistic entails that he or she would suﬀer even more if the same ex ante
utility function was used to compare the two Nash equilibria.
In what follows, we use this observation to provide an example illustrating the
possibility that, irrespective of which function is used to appraise the two Nash
equilibria from the view point of an agent who becomes more optimistic, the
agent may becomes worse-oﬀ as a result of his/her increased optimism.
Example 1
We show this in a simple two-agent setting, in which e = 5. The utility function
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Us (for s = o, p) is taken to be:
Us(e,G) = ln(5− ase) + lnG
with:
ao = 9/10 and ap = 1
It is not diﬃcult to check that the pair of functions Uo and Up so deﬁned lie in
the set U. The optimal choice of eﬀort by an agent with belief π when the other
agent is exerting eﬀort e is denoted e∗(π; e) and is deﬁned by:
e∗(π; e) = arg max
e∈[0,5]
π ln(5− 9e/10) + (1− π) ln(5− e) + ln(e+ e) (5)
From solving and rearranging the ﬁrst order conditions of this program, one can
ﬁnd that the equilibrium combination of eﬀorts associated to the distribution of
beliefs (π1, π2) solves:
e∗1(π1, π2) =
145− 5π1 − 9e∗2(π1, π2)−
2

(145− 5π1 − 9e∗2(π1, π2))
2 − 72[250− 5(10− π1)e∗2(π1, π2)]
36
e∗2(π1, π2) =
145− 5π2 − 9e
∗
1(π1, π2)−
2

(145− 5π2 − 9e∗1(π1, π2))
2 − 72[250− 5(10− π2)e∗1(π1, π2)]
36
Our example compares the Nash equilibria associated to the distributions of
beliefs (π1, π2) = (
1
2 ,
1
2) and (π
′
1, π
′
2) = (
1
2 , 0) (Agent 2 becomes totally pes-
simistic). The functions e∗i (.; .) and Nash equilibria associated to these dis-
tributions of beliefs are depicted in Figure 1 One can see that the combina-
1's effort
2's effort
o
o
Nash (1/2,0)
Nash (1/2,1/2)
Figure 2: Nash equilibria associated to (π1, π2) = (
1
2 ,
1
2) and (π
′
1, π
′
2) = (
1
2 , 0).
tion of eﬀorts at the symmetric "mildly" optimistic Nash equilibrium at beliefs
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(π1, π2) = (
1
2 ,
1
2 ) is:
e∗1(
1
2
,
1
2
) =
145− 5/2− 9e∗2(
1
2 ,
1
2)
36
−
2

(145− 5/2− 9e∗2(
1
2 ,
1
2))
2 − 36(500− 95e∗2(
1
2 ,
1
2))
36
e∗2(
1
2
,
1
2
) =
145− 5/2− 9e∗1(
1
2 ,
1
2)
36
−
2

(145− 5/2− 9e∗1(
1
2 ,
1
2))
2 − 36(500− 95e∗1(
1
2 ,
1
2))
36
or:
e∗1(
1
2
,
1
2
) = e∗2(
1
2
,
1
2
) ≃ 1.752
The combination of eﬀorts at the equilibrium associated to the distribution of
beliefs (π′1, π
′
2) = (
1
2 , 0) is:
e∗1(
1
2
, 0) =
145− 5/2− 9e∗2(
1
2 , 0)
36
−
2

(145− 5/2− 9e∗2(
1
2 , 0))
2 − 36× (500− 95e∗2(
1
2 , 0))
36
e∗2(
1
2
, 0) =
145− 9e∗1(
1
2 , 0)
36
−
2

(145− 9e∗1(
1
2 , 0))
2 − 72× (250− 50e∗1(
1
2 , 0))
36
or:
e∗1(
1
2
, 0) ≃ 1.8369
e∗2(
1
2
, 0) ≃ 1.5815
Welfare of agent 2 at the ﬁrst Nash equilibrium is:
ln(5− 9×1.75210 )
2
+
ln(5− 1.752)
2
+ ln(2× 1.752) ≃ 2.4582
while after becoming pessimistic, the welfare of agent 2 becomes:
ln(5− 1.5815) + ln(1.5815 + 1.8369) ≃ 2.4584
Hence, agent 2 has beneﬁted from becoming pessimistic.
The possibility that an agent may suﬀer as a result of becoming more opti-
mistic comes from the following fact. When an agent becomes more optimistic,
he/she wants to increase her contributive eﬀorts given what the other are doing.
But this increase in contributive eﬀorts lead the other agents to reduce their own
eﬀorts by "free-riding" on the increasingly optimistic agent. If this free riding
eﬀect is suﬃciently important, an agent may suﬀer as a result of becoming more
optimistic. It is obviously more diﬃcult to analyze the welfare eﬀects of non-
monotonic changes in the distributions of beliefs such as those resulting from an
increase in consensus. But the example above shows that increasing optimism
does not necessarily lead to an increase in welfare.
3 Conclusion
This paper has examined the problem, for a community of agents, of voluntarily
contributing to a public good when there is subjective uncertainty about the
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beneﬁt of these contributive eﬀorts when agents diﬀer in terms of their assess-
ment of this uncertainty. While we believe that reductions in carbon emissions
with the aim of preventing global warming is a good example of this kind of
situation, there are many others. Obvious examples are contributions to char-
itable organizations when people are uncertain the quality of the management
therein, or individuals’ decisions to vaccinate. When individuals have diﬀerent
subjective perceptions of the uncertain beneﬁt of collective action, they may
try to modify the beliefs held by others through debate or, perhaps, activism.
Hence, this paper may be seen as providing some justiﬁcation for this activism.
In eﬀect, we have shown that increasing the average belief in the eﬀectiveness
of collective action may indeed lead to an increase in aggregate contributions
even when individuals behave non-cooperatively. The paper has also shown that
increasing the consensus amongst the members of the community about the ben-
eﬁt of collective action can lead to such an increase in aggregate contributions.
This favorable impact of activism that would lead to both an increase in aver-
age optimism and a convergence in point of view toward this average have been
shown under somewhat strong, but not unreasonable, conditions on the contrib-
utors’ subjective valuation of the beneﬁt of collective action. The paper has also
established, by means of an example, that speciﬁc increases in aggregate eﬀorts
brought about by an increase in optimism and/or consensus in the community
may not always be associated with unanimous welfare gains.
The analysis performed in this paper is yet incomplete in many respects.
One of its limitations is the two-state setting in which it is framed. As modeled
in this paper, an individual contributor faces indeed only two states of the
world: an "optimistic" one in which collective action is perceived favorably, and
a "pessimistic" one where this perception is less favorable. It would obviously be
interesting to generalize the analysis to more than two states. But doing so is not
as straightforward as it may seem. For one thing, it leaves open the question of
deﬁning what it means for the consensus in beliefs (about the occurrence of the
various states) to increase in the society. When there are only two states, each
assigned with some probability, it is natural to deﬁne an increase in consensus
by Lorenz dominance over one of the two probabilities summing to one. Indeed,
in such a case making a Pigou-Dalton transfer in the probabilities attributed
to one state by two agents immediately imply making a Pigou-Dalton in the
probabilities assigned to the other state between these two same agents. But
this implication does not hold if there are more than two states. If there are, say,
three states, and if a Pigou-Dalton transfer is made between two probabilities
assigned to the ﬁrst state by the two agents, how is the change in the probability
assigned to the ﬁrst state by each agent as a result of this transfer assumed to
be distributed among the two other states in such a way as to preserve the
requirement that the probabilities must sum to one ? There seems therefore to
be the need of developing a general theory of what it means for two probability
distributions over more than two states to be closer to each other.
The analysis of this paper leads also to testable predictions. It is obviously
an agenda for future research to test these predictions empirically and, possibly,
in an experimental context.
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A Appendix: proofs.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Since the functions Uo and Up are in the set U , they are at least thrice diﬀerentiable.
Hence, the function T deﬁned by (3) is at least twice diﬀerentiable. Proving the result
amounts therefore to verifying that:
Te(π,e, G) = π[Uoee(e, G) + 2UoeG(e, G) + UoGG(e, G)]
+(1− π)[Upee(e, G) + 2UpeG(e, G) + UpGG(e, G)]
< 0 (6)
and,
TG(π, e, G) = π[UoeG(e, G) + UoGG(e, G)]
+(1− π)[UpeG(e, G) + UpGG(e, G)]
< 0 (7)
But Inequalities (6) and (7) are implied by the concavity of Uo and Up and the fact
that they satisfy UseG(e, G) = UsGe(e, G) ≤ 0 for s = o, p.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We observe ﬁrst that, because of the strict concavity of the functions Uo and Up, the
program:
max
ei∈[0,e]
πiU
o(ei, ei +G) + (1− πi)U
p(ei, ei +G) (8)
admits a unique solution for any πi and any given real number G ∈ [0, (n− 1)e]. In
eﬀect, for any such πi and G, the function ΨπiG : [0, e] −→ R deﬁned by:
ΨπiG(e) = πiU
o(e, e+G) + (1− πi)U
p(e, e+G)
is continuous. By Weirstrass theorem, the maximization of a continuous function
over a compact set (such as [0, e]) admits a solution. The strict concavity of both
Uo and Up ensures the strict concavity of the function ΨπiG and, therefore, the
uniqueness of the maximizer of this function for any πi and G. Let e
∗(πi, G) de-
note the value of this unique maximizer of ΨπiG. If follows from Berge (1959) (p.
122) maximum theorem that e∗ is a continuous function from [0, 1] × [0, (n − 1)e]
to [0, e]. It thus follows that, given the distribution of beliefs (π1, ..., πn), the func-
tion e∗ : [0, e]n → [0, e]n deﬁned, for any (e1, ..., en) ∈ [0, e]n, by e∗(e1, ..., en) =
(e∗(π1,

j
ej), e
∗(π2,

j
ej), ..., e
∗(πn,

j
ej)) is continuous. Since the domain of e∗
is compact and convex, the function e∗ admits a ﬁxed point by by Brouwer’s ﬁxed point
theorem. Any ﬁxed point of e∗ is clearly a Nash equilibrium. Hence a Nash equilibrium
of the game G(π1, ..., πn) exists for any distribution of beliefs (π1, ..., πn). We now
show that this equilibrium is unique. By contradiction, suppose (π1, ..., πn) ∈ [0, 1]
n
is a distribution of beliefs for which there are two distinct combinations of eﬀorts
(e∗1, ..., e
∗
n) and (e1, ..., en) that are Nash equilibria for the game G(π1, ..., πn). Since
(e∗1, ..., e
∗
n) and (e1, ...,en) are distinct, there exists some i ∈ N for which e∗i = ei.
Without loss of generality (up to a change in the role of (e∗1, ..., e
∗
n) and (e1, ..., en)
in the argument), we assume 0 ≤ e∗i < ei. We consider two mutually exclusive cases:
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(i)

j∈N
e∗j ≥

j∈N
ej and,
(ii)

j∈N
e∗j <

j∈N
ej .
If case (i) holds, then, since 0 ≤ e∗i < ei for some agent i, there must be some agent h
for which one has 0 ≤ eh < e∗h. Since 0 > Use (e,G) + UsG(e,G) for any G ∈ [0, ne]
and s = o, p, one has e∗h < e. Hence e
∗
h is in the interior of the interval [0, e] and,
as a component of a Nash equilibrium vector, must satisfy the ﬁrst order condition of
Program (8). Similarly, eh ≥ 0 is by assumption a component of a Nash equilibrium
vector which may, or may not, be interior. One must thus have:
T (πh, e
∗
h,

j∈N
e∗j ) = 0 ≥ T (πh, eh,
j∈N
ej)
But since eh < e∗h, this inequality is incompatible with the properties, established in
Lemma 1, that T is strictly decreasing with respect to e and G.
If case (ii) holds, then we have 0 ≤ e∗i < ei for some individual i and 
j∈N
e∗j <

j∈N
ej .
For the same reason than before, ei is interior to the interval [0, e] while e∗i is either
zero or in the interior of that same interval. Since by assumption both e∗i and ei are
part of a Nash equilibrium, they satisfy (using the ﬁrst-order conditions of Program
(8)):
T (πi,ei,
j∈N
ej) = 0 ≥ T (πi, e∗i ,
j∈N
e∗j )
But again, since both e∗i < ei and 
j∈N
e∗j <

j∈N
ej , this inequality is incompatible
with the fact, established in Lemma 1, that T is strictly decreasing with respect to e
and G.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst observe that if Uo and Up are functions in U that satisfy Condition 1, then
the function T deﬁned by (3) is strictly increasing with respect to π. Observing this
amounts to observing, thanks to the diﬀerentiability of T , that
Tπ(π, e, G) = Uoe (e, G)− Upe (e, G) + UoG(e, G)− UpG(e, G)
> 0
if Uo and Up satisfy Condition 1. Given this observation, we start by proving the
ﬁrst statement of the Proposition. Let π = (π1, ..., πn) ∈ [0, 1]
n be a distribution of
beliefs and e∗(π) ∈ [0, e]n be the unique (thanks to Proposition 1) Nash equilibrium
of the associated game and assume by contradiction that there are agents h and i
such that πi ≥ πh and e∗i (π) < e
∗
h(π). This entails that e
∗
h(π) > 0. Since 0 >
Use (e,

j∈N
e∗j (π)) +U
s
G(e,

j∈N
e∗j (π)) for s = o, p, one has e
∗
h(π) < e. Hence e
∗
h(π)
is in the interior of the interval [0, e] and satisﬁes therefore the ﬁrst order condition
of Program (8):
T (πh, e
∗
h(π),

j∈N
e∗j (π)) = 0
while e∗i (π1, ..., πn) satisﬁes:
T (πi, e
∗
i (π),

j∈N
e∗j (π)) ≤ 0
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But when combined with the assumption that e∗i (π) < e
∗
h(π), these two inequalities
are clearly incompatible with the (just established) increasing nature of T with respect
to π and the strict decreasing nature of of T with respect to e established in Lemma
1. For the second statement of the lemma, let again π = (π1, ..., πn) ∈ [0, 1]
n be
a distribution of beliefs and e∗(π) be the unique Nash equilibrium of the associated
game. Assume that h and i are agents such that e∗i (π) > 0, e
∗
h(π) > 0 and πi > πh.
By contradiction, assume that e∗i (π) ≤ e
∗
h(π). For the same reason as before, both
levels of contributions e∗h(π) and e
∗
i (π) are in the interior of the interval [0, e] and
satisfy therefore the ﬁrst-order condition of Program.(8):
T (πh, e
∗
h(π),

j∈N
e∗j (π)) = 0 = T (πi, e
∗
i (π),

j∈N
e∗j (π))
But, when combined with e∗i (π) ≤ e
∗
h(π) and πi > πh, this equality is incompatible
with the strict increasing nature of of T with respect to π and the decreasing nature
of of T with respect to e established in Lemma 1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
For the ﬁrst statement of the Proposition, let π = (π1, ..., πn) and π′= (π′1, ..., π
′
n)
be two distributions of beliefs satisfying π1 ≤ π2 ≤ ... ≤ πn, π
′
1 ≤ π
′
2 ≤ ... ≤ π
′
n and
πi ≥ π′i for all i and let e
∗(π) ∈ [0, e]n and e∗(π′) ∈ [0, e]n be the unique (thanks
to Proposition 1) Nash equilibria of their associated games. Assume by contradiction
that

i
e∗i (π) <

i
e∗i (π
′). For this inequality to hold, there must be an agent h
such that 0 ≤ e∗h(π) < e
∗
h(π
′). Since e∗h(π
′) is in the interior of [0, e] for the same
reason than that invoked in the proof of Proposition 2, it follows from the ﬁrst-order
condition of Program (8) that:
T (πh, e
∗
h(π
′),

j∈N
e∗j (π
′)) = 0 ≥ T (πh, e
∗
h(π),

j∈N
e∗j (π
′))
But this inequality is incompatible with the strict increasing nature of of T with
respect to π established in the proof of Proposition 2 and its strict decreasing nature
of with respect to both e and G established in Lemma 1.
For the second statement of the proposition, let π = (π1, ..., πn) and π
′= (π′1, ..., π
′
n)
be two distributions of beliefs satisfying π1 ≤ π2 ≤ ... ≤ πn, π
′
1 ≤ π
′
2 ≤ ... ≤ π
′
n,
πi ≥ π′i for all i and πh > π
′
h for at least one agent agent h ∈ {c(π
′), c(π′)+1, ..., n}
and assume, by contradiction, that

i
e∗i (π) ≤

i
e∗i (π
′). From the ﬁrst part of the
proposition proved above, the only possibility of observing this weak inequality is
to have

i
e∗i (π) =

i
e∗i (π
′) = G∗ for some strictly positive G∗. Consider any
agent, such as h, who is a strict contributor in the Nash equilibrium associated to
the distribution of beliefs π′. Because the contribution e∗h(π
′) is interior to [0, e]
(again thanks to the assumption that 0 > Use (e,

j∈N
e∗j (π
′))+UsG(e,

j∈N
e∗j (π
′)) for
s = o, p), if satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions of Program (8):
T (π′h, e
∗
h(π
′), G∗) = 0 ≥ T (πh, e
∗
h(π), G
∗) (9)
where the second inequality comes from the ﬁrst-order condition associated to the fact
that h may or may not be a strict contributor in the Nash equilibrium associated to
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the distribution of beliefs π. Since, by Lemma 1, T is strictly increasing in π and
strictly decreasing with respect to both e and G, the only way to make Inequality (9)
compatible with πh > π
′
h is to have:
e∗h(π) > e
∗
h(π
′) (10)
Hence all strict contributors in the Nash equilibrium associated to π′ who experienced
a strict increase in their belief in the change to distribution π strictly increase their
equilibrium contributions as a result. If one now applies Inequality (9) to a strict
contributor in the Nash equilibrium associated to π′ whose belief does not change
when moving to π, one is led to the conclusion (using strict decreasing nature of
of T with respect to e) that any such strict contributor must have weakly increased
his/her contribution. But this conclusion that all strict contributors in the distribution
π
′ who experienced an increase in their belief in the move to distribution π′ (and
there is at least one such strict contributor) and all strict contributors weakly increase
their contribution is clearly incompatible with the fact that the aggregate public good
provision G∗is the same at the two Nash equilibria. This contradiction completes the
proof.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider distributions of beliefs π = (π1, ..., πn) and π
′= (π′1, ..., π
′
n) such that:
πj = π′j for all j ∈ N\{g, h} and,
πh = π′h − δ ≥ π
′
g + δ = πg
for some δ > 0 and g, h such that c(π′) ≤ g < h.We ﬁrst show that both agents g and
h will remain strict contributors at the Nash equilibrium associated to the distribution
of beliefs π For this sake, we consider the distribution of beliefs π = (π1, ..., πn)
deﬁned by: πi = π′i
for all i ∈ N\{g} and by: πg = π′g + δ = πg
Distribution π clearly dominates at the ﬁrst-order distribution π′ and is such that
π′g + δ = πg > π′g. We therefore concludes from Proposition 3 (and notably the proof
of the second statement of the proposition) that

i∈N
e∗i (π) >
i∈N
e∗i (π
′)
and that:
e∗g(π) > e∗g(π′) > 0
Since πh = π′h > π′h − δ ≥ π′g + δ = πg, it follows from Proposition 2 that
e∗h(π) > e∗g(π) > 0 so that h remains an active contributor at the Nash equilibrium
associated to the distribution of beliefs π. Compare now distributions π and π. It is
clear that π ﬁrst-order dominates π. From the ﬁrst statement of Proposition 3, one
has therefore: 
i∈N
e∗i (π) ≥
i∈N
e∗i (π) (11)
We ﬁnally show that the just established presence of g in the list of strict contributors
at the Nash equilibrium associated to π makes both g and h strict contributors at the
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Nash equilibrium associated to π. For this sake, we exploit the ﬁrst-order condition
associated to the strict contribution of g at the Nash equilibrium associated to π as
per Program (8) and write:
T (πg, e∗g(π),
i∈N
e∗i (π)) = 0 ≥ T (πg, e∗g(π),
i∈N
e∗i (π))
Since the continuous function T is decreasing with respect to both e and G thanks to
Lemma 1 and πg = πg, this inequality can only arise if 0 < e∗g(π) ≤ e∗g(π). Hence
g remains a strict contributor at the Nash equilibrium associated to π and so does
h by Proposition 2 (because πh = π
′
h − δ ≥ π
′
g + δ = πg). Consider now the two
(non-empty but possibly distinct) sets of strict contributors C(π′) = {c(π′), ..., n}
and C(π) = {c(π), ...n} in the Nash equilibria associated to distributions π′ and π
respectively. These two sets have a non-empty intersection since, as we just established
(and thanks to Proposition 2), {g, g+1, ..., h, h+1, ..., n} ⊆ C(π′)∩C(π). For any
agent i ∈ C(π′)∩C(π), one can write (thanks to the ﬁrst order condition of program
(8) applied to an interior contribution):
T (π′i, e
∗
i (π
′), G∗(π′)) = 0 = T (πi, e
∗
i (π), G
∗(π)) (12)
where G∗(π) and G∗(π′) denote the Nash equilibrium aggregate public good quan-
tities at the Nash equilibria associated to π and π′ respectively. Expression (12) can
alternatively be written as:
T (πi, e
∗
i (π), G
∗(π))− T (π′i, e
∗
i (π
′), G∗(π′)) ≡ 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n
or, equivalently, for every i ∈ C(π′) ∩ C(π):
T (πi, e
∗
i (π), G
∗(π))− T (πi, e
∗
i (π
′), G∗(π)) 	 

A
+T (πi, e
∗
i (π
′), G∗(π)− T (πi, e
∗
i (π
′), G∗(π′)) 	 

B
+T (πi, e
∗
i (π
′), G∗(π′))− T (π′i, e
∗
i (π
′), G∗(π′)) 	 

C
≡ 0
We now proceed to rewrite each of the A, B and C expressions (when the latter are
not null) in terms of relevant expressions involving derivatives of the function T thanks
to the Mean Value Theorem. Expression C is null for all contributing agents (if any)
in the two Nash equilibria whose beliefs have not changed. Applying the Mean value
theorem to Expressions A, B and C for agents g and h implied in the Pigou-Dalton
transfer yields:
Te(πg, eg, G
∗(π))∆eg (13)
+TG(πg, e
∗
g(π
′), G)∆G
+Tπ(πg, e
∗
g(π
′), G∗(π′)δ
≡ 0
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and:
Te(πh, eh, G
∗(π))∆eh (14)
+TG(πh, e
∗
h(π
′), G)∆G
−Tπ(πh, e
∗
h(π
′), G∗(π′))δ
≡ 0
where:
∆G = G∗(π)−G∗(π′),
∆ei = e
∗
i (π)− e
∗
i (π
′) for every i ∈ C(π′) ∩ C(π)
and ei (for every i ∈ C(π
′) ∩ C(π)), G, πg and πh are numbers satisfying:
ei ∈ [min{e
∗
i (π), e
∗
i (π
′)},max{e∗i (π), e
∗
i (π
′)}
G ∈ [min{G∗(π), G∗(π′)},max{G∗(π), G∗(π′)}
πg ∈ [π
′
g, π
′
g + δ]
πh ∈ [π
′
h − δ, π
′
h]
Using similar notation, one can also apply the Mean value theorem to Expressions
A and B for every contributor i ∈ C(π′) ∩ C(π) whose belief has not changed and
obtain:
Te(πi, ei, G
∗(π))∆ei + TG(πi, e
∗
i (π
′), G)∆G ≡ 0 (15)
Exploiting the strict monotonicity of T established in Lemma 1, one can write equa-
tions (13), (14) and (15) as:
∆eg ≡ −δ
Tπ(πg, e
∗
g(π
′), G∗(π′))
Te(πg, eg, G∗(π))
−
TG(πg, e
∗
g(π
′), G)
Te(πg, eg, G∗(π))
∆G,
∆eh ≡ δ
Tπ(πh, e∗h(π
′), G∗(π′))
Te(πh, eh, G∗(π))
−
TG(πh, e∗h(π
′),G)
Te(πh, eh, G∗(π))
∆G,
and:
∆ei ≡ −
TG(πi, e
∗
i (π
′), G)
Te(πi, ei, G∗(π))
∆G
Summing these equations over all contributing agents who are common to the two
Nash equilibria and rearranging yields:

i∈C(π′)∩C(π)
∆ei+∆G[

i∈C(π′)∩C(π)
TG(πi, e
∗
i (π
′), G)
Te(πi, ei, G∗(π))
] = δ[
Tπ(πh, e
∗
h(π
′), G∗(π′))
Te(πh, eh, G∗(π))
−
Tπ(πg, e∗g(π
′), G∗(π′))
Te(πg, eg, G∗(π))
]
(16)
Now, observe that:
∆G =

i∈C(π′)∩C(π)
∆ei +

j∈C(π)\C(π′)
e∗j (π)−

k∈C(π′)\C(π)
e∗k(π
′) (17)
We now show that

j∈C(π)\C(π′)
e∗j (π) (the aggregate contribution at the Nash equi-
librium of distribution π of agents who were not contributing at the Nash equilibrium
24
of π′) and

k∈C(π′)\C(π)
e∗k(π
′) (the aggregate contribution at π′ of agents who are
not contributing at π) at the right hand side of (17) can not be both strictly positive.
Indeed consider any agent j ∈ C(π)\C(π′). Because this agent strictly contributes
when the distribution of beliefs is π but does not contribute when the distribution is
π
′, one must have by the First order conditions of Program (8) (recalling that the
belief of this agent does not change in the move from π′ to π):
T (πj , e
∗
j (π), G
∗(π)) = 0 ≥ T (πj , e
∗
j (π
′), G∗(π′)) (18)
Since e∗j (π) > 0 = e
∗
j (π
′) and T is strictly decreasing with respect to both e
and G by Lemma 1, Inequality (18) can hold only if G∗(π′) > G∗(π). Similarly,
considering now an agent k ∈ C(π′)\C(π) (whose belief does not change between
the two distributions) who strictly contributes when the π′ but does not contribute
when it is π, one must have:
T (π′k, e
∗
k(π
′), G∗(π′)) = 0 ≥ T (πk, e
∗
k(π), G
∗(π)) (19)
which is only possible (given that e∗k(π
′) > 0 = e∗k(π) and T is strictly decreasing
with respect to both e and G) if G∗(π) > G∗(π′). Hence either there are agents
j ∈ C(π)\C(π′) who contribute at distribution π but not at distribution π′ (in
which case G∗(π′) > G∗(π)) or there are agents k ∈ C(π′)\C(π) who contribute
at π′ but not at π in which case G∗(π) > G∗(π′). We observe that in the latter
case, the proof is complete. We are now going to show that C(π)\C(π′) = ∅ so that
there are indeed no contributors in distribution π that were not already contributing
in distribution π′. Suppose by contradiction that there are some such contributors so
that G∗(π′) > G∗(π). Since in that case C(π′)\C(π) = ∅, one can write Expression
(17) as:
∆G =

i∈C(π′)∩C(π)
∆ei +

j∈C(π)\C(π′)
e∗j (π)
≥

i∈C(π′)∩C(π)
∆ei (20)
because

j∈C(π)\C(π′)
e∗j (π) ≥ 0. Substituting Inequality (20) into (16) and rearranging
yields:
∆G ≥
δ[Tπ(πh,e
∗
h(π
′),G∗(π′))
Te(πh,eh,G∗(π))
−
Tπ(πg,e
∗
g(π
′),G∗(π′))
Te(πg,eg,G∗(π))
]
1 +

i∈C(π′)∩C(π)
TG(πi,e∗i (π
′),G)
Te(πi,ei,G∗(π)
(21)
The denominator of the right hand side of this inequality is strictly positive for all
functions Uo and Up in the set U . Hence the whole right-hand side of this inequality
will be positive if and only if :
Tπ(πh, e∗h(π
′),G∗(π′))
Te(πh, eh, G∗(π))
−
Tπ(πg, e∗g(π
′), G∗(π′))
Te(πg, eg, G∗(π)
> 0
or, equivalently (given the strict negativity of Te and the strict positivity of Tπ):
Te(πg, eg, G
∗(π))
Te(πh, eh, G∗(π))
<
Tπ(πg, e
∗
g(π
′), G∗(π′))
Tπ(πh, e∗h(π
′), G∗(π′))
(22)
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Thanks to Proposition 2, one has e∗g(π
′) < e∗h(π
′). Hence it follows from Part (i) of
Condition 2 that:
Tπ(πg, e
∗
g(π
′),G∗(π′)) =
Uoe (e
∗
g(π
′), G∗(π′))− Upe (e
∗
g(π
′), G∗(π′))
+UoG(e
∗
g(π
′), G∗(π′))− UpG(e
∗
g(π
′), G∗(π′))
≥ Uoe (e
∗
h(π
′), G∗(π′))− Upe (e
∗
h(π
′), G∗(π′))
+UoG(e
∗
h(π
′), G∗(π′))− UpG(e
∗
h(π
′),G∗(π′))
= Tπ(πh, e
∗
h(π
′), G∗(π′))
Moreover, it follows from Part (ii) of Condition 2 that:
Te(πg, eg,G
∗(π)) = πg[U
o
ee(eg,G
∗(π)) + 2UoeG(eg, G
∗(π))
+UoGG(eg, G
∗(π))]
+(1− πg)[U
p
ee(eg, G
∗(π)) + 2UpeG(eg, G
∗(π))
+UpGG(eg, G
∗(π))]
≤ πh[U
o
ee(eh, G
∗(π)) + 2UoeG(eh, G
∗(π))
+UoGG(eh, G
∗(π))]
+(1− πh)[U
p
ee(eh, G
∗(π)) + 2UpeG(eh, G
∗(π))
+UpGG(eh, G
∗(π))]
= Te(πh, eg, G
∗(π))
because, as was established above e∗g(π
′) < eg < e
∗
g(π) ≤ e
∗
h(π) < eh < e
∗
h(π). We
have just shown that:
Te(πg, eg, G
∗(π))
Te(πh, eh, G∗(π))
≤ 1 ≤
Tπ(πg, e
∗
g(π
′), G∗(π′))
Tπ(πh, e∗h(π
′), G∗(π′))
using the two parts of Condition 2. Because both e∗g(π
′) < e∗h(π
′) and eg < eh hold,
we can use the last part of Condition 2 to conclude that at least one of these two
Inequalities must be strict so that (22) holds. Hence ∆G > 0 thanks to (21) and, as a
result, one must have C(π)\C(π′) = ∅. Hence all active contributors in π were active
contributors in π′ and the total quantity of public good that these active contributors
in π are providing is larger than the quantity provided at distribution π′ (despite the
non-ruled-out possibility that some active contributors in π′ stop to contribute in π).
This completes the proof.
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